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THE LOWER COURT INCORRECTLY RULED THAT 
MILLER'S DUE PROCESS RIGHTS WERE VIOLATED. 
Miller asserts in his reply brief that the lower court was correct in ruling that his 
due process rights were violated when he was not given a temporary license by the 
arresting officer prior to the revocation hearing, and that in its responsive brief the Driver 
License Division (hereinafter Division) incorrectly relied upon Mackey v. Montrvm. 443 
U.S. 1 (1979) and Dixon v. Love, 431 U.S. 105 (1977). Miller's arguments are without 
merit. 
There is no question that driving privileges " are not to be taken away without that 
Due Process required by the Fourteenth Amendment." Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 539 
(1971), and as cited in Miller's brief, "[procedural due process entails procedural 
requirements, notably notice and opportunity to be heard, which must be observed in 
order to have a valid proceeding affecting life, liberty, or property." In re N.H.B., 777 
P.2d 487, 489 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
The issue here is whether it was violative of Miller's due process to have his 
license taken away by the arresting officer without being given a temporary driver's 
license to use until the Division took administrative action. There is no question that 
Miller received notice of the Division's intent to suspend or revoke his license and 
pursuant to that notice, Miller asked for and received a hearing before the Division prior 
to the Division taking any administrative action to revoke Miller's license. And, there is 
no question that Miller was unable to drive, due to the arresting officer's mistake and in 
violation of a statute, for a period of 25 days prior to the Driver License hearing. 
However, this statutory violation by the arresting officer does not rise to the level of a due 
process violation in light of the United States Supreme Court rulings in Montrym and 
Love. 
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Unlike the instant case, the issue the Supreme Court in Montrym and Love had to 
resolve was whether a Massachusetts' statute and a Illinois statute were void on their 
face. However, the court's reasoning and conclusions are equally applicable here. The 
Supreme Court analyzed both cases by balancing the following three factors set forth in 
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976): "First, the private interest that will be 
affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such 
interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or 
substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the government's interest, including the 
function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or 
substitute procedural requirement would entail." Montrym, 443 U.S. at 11. 
Here, as in Montrym and Love the private interest being affected is the granted 
license to operate a motor vehicle, or "[m]ore particularly the driver's interest in 
continued possession and use of his license pending the outcome of the hearing due him." 
Id. "The duration of any potentially wrongful deprivation of a property interest is an 
important factor in assessing the impact of official action on the private interest 
involved." Id., citing Fusari v. Steinberg, 419 U.S. 379, 389, (1975). Under the 
Montrym statute, a post suspension hearing is available immediately upon a driver's 
suspension and may be initiated by him simply by walking into one of the Registrar's 
local offices and requesting a hearing. Id. at 12. The Love statute did not mandate that a 
date be set for a post suspension hearing until 20 days after a written request for such a 
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hearing was received from the affected driver. Love 431 U.S. at 109-110. Here, Miller 
received a hearing prior to any final action taken by the Division. Prior to that hearing 
Miller was without a temporary license for only 25 days. As such, the duration of any 
potentially wrongful deprivation of Miller's property interest was no greater than in 
Montrym or Love. 
"The second stage of the Eldridge inquiry requires consideration of the likelihood 
of an erroneous deprivation of the private interest involved as a consequence of the 
procedures used/9 Montrym, 443 U.S. at 12. The "Due Process Clause has never been 
construed to require that the procedures used to guard against an erroneous deprivation of 
a protectible "property" or "liberty" interest be so comprehensive as to preclude any 
possibility of error." Id. The Supreme Court has determined that something less than an 
evidentiary hearing is sufficient prior to adverse administrative action. Id. at 13, citing 
Love, 431 U.S. at 113. "And, when prompt post deprivation review is available for 
correction of administrative error, [the Supreme Court has] generally required no more 
than that the pre-deprivation procedures used be designed to provide a reasonably reliable 
basis for concluding that the facts justifying the official action are as a responsible 
governmental official warrants them to be." Id. In this case, there was no administrative 
action by the Division taken prior to the deprivation hearing. However, the error by the 
arresting officer resulted in Miller being without his license until the deprivation hearing. 
In looking at the procedures used by the arresting officer in this case, and required by 
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statute, they are designed to provide a reasonably reliable basis for concluding that the 
facts justifying the action are as he warrants them to be. 
Here, the arresting officer had determined that there was probable cause to arrest 
Miller for violation of section 41-6-44, Utah Code Annotated, he read the chemical test 
admonitions, including the refusal admonition, verbatim to Miller, and Miller refused to 
submit to the requested chemical tests. (Appellee's Responsive Brief/Cross-Appellant's 
Opening Brief, Addendum A at 2). The arresting officer then filed out the DUI Summons 
and Citation, served it upon Miller. (Appellee's Responsive Brief7Cross-Appellant's 
Opening Brief, Addendum A at 2). The arresting officer knew that his actions and his 
DUI Report would be reviewed by the Division prior to any administrative action taken 
by the Division to suspend or revoke Miller's license. In Miller's case, the arresting 
officer's actions were reviewed 25 days later and at which time the Division revoked 
Miller's driving privilege. As such, there were sufficient safeguards in place to insure 
against any erroneous deprivations. 
The third factor of the Eldridge test is to identify the governmental function 
involved and to weigh in the balance the state interests served by the summary procedures 
used, as well as the administrative and fiscal burdens, if any, that would result from the 
substitute procedures sought. Eldridge, 424 U.S. at 335, Montyrm, 443 U.S. at 17. 
In the instant case, we are not looking a statute which authorizes summary procedures in 
depriving an individual of his driving privileges, but an isolated error by an arresting 
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officer which resulted in a temporary deprivation of Miller's driving privilege prior to an 
administrative hearing. Nonetheless, the paramount governmental interest here, as in 
Love and Montryiru is in preserving the safety of its people on the public highways. Id at 
18. In both Love and Montrym, the Supreme Court allowed summary deprivation 
procedures when the public's safety is at risk. Id at 19. As such, the failure of the 
arresting officer to give Miller a temporary driver's license to use prior to any 
administrative action did not amount to a due process violation. 
POINT II. 
THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY HELD THAT THE 
VIOLATION OF THE STATUTE IS NOT FATAL TO THE 
REVOCATION PROCESS. 
Miller in his reply brief argues that the violation of section 41-6-44.10(2), Utah 
Code Ann. is fatal to the revocation process in light of this court's ruling in Mabus v. 
Blackstock, 994 P.2d 1272 (Ut. App. 1999). Miller argues that since the failure of the 
police officer to give Miller a temporary license is a violation of the same statute as was 
violated in Mabus, then the statutory violation in this case is also fatal to the revocation 
process. However, this argument fails to consider the reasons this court used in 
determining that a failure of a police officer to serve notice of the Division's intent to 
suspend or revoke and information on how to obtain a hearing is fatal to the revocation 
process. 
In Mabus, this court looked to what initiated the revocation process and 
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determined that it was service of notice and basic information pursuant to section 41-6-
44.10(2), Utah Code Ann. Mabus, 994 P.2d at 1274. This court ruled that "whether 
denominated jurisdictional or not, service of immediate notice and basic information is 
essential to the validity of the subsequent proceedings for revocation." Id. This court did 
not rule that failure to follow all of the requirements of section 41-6-44.10(2) was fatal to 
the revocation process nor should this court's ruling in Mabus be interpreted to do so. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Driver License Division respectfully requests that 
this court reverse the lower court's ruling that a failure to comply with Utah Code Ann. § 
41-6-44,10 (2)(b)(iii) is a due process violation and to modify the remedy the lower court 
fashioned after correctly finding a statutory violation. The Driver License Division asks 
this court to rule that the statutory violation did not rise to a level of a due process 
violation and that the appropriate remedy for the statutory violation is to make the year 
revocation effective the date Miller was arrested for driving under the influence and had 
his license taken by the arresting officer. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this T Day of October, 2001 
REBECCA D. WALDRON 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorney for Driver License Division 
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